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THE TRIUMPH OF JUSTICE 
Stephan Landsman* 
THE AFFAIR: THE CASE OF ALFRED DREYFUS. By Jean-Denis Bre-
din. New York: George Braziller, Inc. 1986. Pp. xii, 628. $24.95. 
I. THE DREYFUS CASE 
Alfred Dreyfus was an anomaly in the French army of 1894. He 
was the scion of a wealthy bourgeois Jewish family that had extensive 
business interests in what had become German Alsace. He served, 
however, in a military that was overwhelmingly Catholic and xeno-
phobic, as well as decidedly anti-semitic. Dreyfus was a hard-driving 
and abrasive young officer in a milieu that viewed such traits as ungen-
tlemanly. He was a straight-laced martinet whose rigid demeanor was 
deemed offensive by many of his fellows. While these traits endeared 
him to few of his colleagues, they did not prevent him from rising 
rapidly in the French army. Dreyfus was a resounding success in both 
his military studies and his duty assignments. As a result, he was one 
of the few Jewish officers posted to the French General Staff. 
All went exceedingly well for Dreyfus until the fall of 1894 when 
French military counterintelligence recovered a note (bordereau) from 
the wastebasket of the German military attache in Paris, Maximilien 
van Schwarzkoppen. The note appeared to be a cover letter detailing 
the transmission of a number of secret military documents to the 
Germans. The bordereau constituted clear evidence that there was a 
traitor in the French officer corps. 
The discovery of the bordereau set in motion an intensive military 
investigation. For all its intensity, however, the inquiry was far from 
careful or balanced. In short order several members of the French 
General Staff propounded the unsupported hypothesis that the un-
pleasant Jewish officer, Dreyfus, was the traitor. Once uttered, this 
accusation was virtually irresistible. The military inquiry became 
nothing more than an effort to document Dreyfus' guilt. Handwriting 
experts were consulted in an attempt to link Dreyfus' handwriting 
with that of the bordereau. Expert opinions that did not support the 
official hypothesis were discarded, and further expert opinions were 
solicited to insure that an imposing volume of proof was accumu-
lated.1 Despite the army's exertions, the case against Dreyfus re-
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. B.A. 
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1. Bredin indicates that five handwriting experts were consulted at this stage of the proceed-
ings and that only three were willing to attribute the bordereau to Dreyfus. Pp. 67-75. 
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mained weak and might not have been pursued but for the leaking of 
information about the matter to rabidly anti-semitic elements in the 
French press. These scandal sheets trumpeted news of a Jewish traitor 
in the ranks and made it extremely difficult for the government to back 
away from the prosecution of Dreyfus. 
In the midst of the army's investigations Dreyfus was seized and 
imprisoned. He was given virtually no explanation for his detention 
and was interrogated in the most bizarre and threatening manner. 
The arrest and interrogation plunged Dreyfus into a nightmare world 
of maltreatment and accusation. He was eventually brought before a 
seven-member military tribunal and prosecuted on a charge of treason. 
He was ably defended by a conservative stalwart of the French bar, 
Ma.ltre Edgar Demange. Lawyer and client conducted themselves 
well, and a number of observers thought conviction unlikely on the 
basis of the evidence presented during the proceedings. 
Acquittal of Dreyfus would have seriously undermined the credi-
bility and perhaps even the political viability of top leaders in the 
French army and government. Faced with this prospect a number of 
army officers entered into a conspiracy to fabricate evidence demon-
strating Dreyfus' guilt. The files of the counterintelligence bureau 
were ransacked to provide accusatory documents that were then al-
tered to implicate Dreyfus. These forgeries were, in flagrant violation 
of law, secretly communicated to the panel of officers sitting in judg-
ment of Dreyfus. 
The Jewish captain was convicted and sentenced to military degra-
dation and perpetual imprisonment on Devil's Island, a volcanic rock 
off the coast of French Guiana. Such a deportation was seen as virtu-
ally the equivalent of "being dispatched to the executioner" (p. 125) 
because of the island's awful climate and high incidence of malaria. 
Dreyfus' conviction was applauded throughout France. It was widely 
anticipated that before very long Dreyfus would succumb in the 
hellhole in which he had been confined, thus ending the affair. 
But Dreyfus would not give in and die. While he fought for his 
life, his brother Mathieu and wife Lucie began the risky2 and difficult 
process of enlisting support for a review of Dreyfus' conviction. De-
spite their remarkable courage and untiring efforts, and the support of 
a small band of men like Bernard Lazare who sought to address the 
question of anti-semitism implicit in the case, little would have come 
of their efforts were it not for Lieutenant Colonel Georges Picquart. 
After the close of Dreyfus' trial, Picquart, one of the fastest-rising 
stars in the French army, was given command of the counterintel-
ligence bureau. All went routinely until March 1896. In that month a 
2. French agents had the entire Dreyfus family under surveillance. Mail addressed to Lucie 
and Mathieu was regularly opened. The police also set "traps of all sort" to try to ensnare them. 
P. 114. 
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French espionage agent retrieved another vitally important scrap from 
the wastebasket of the German military attache. This document, most 
frequently referred to as the petit bleu because of its color and use in 
the transmission of letter-telegrams, demonstrated that a traitor was 
still active within the French military establishment. Conveniently, 
the document bore the name of its author, Commandant Marie 
Charles Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy. Picquart, who had served as 
official observer on behalf of the French General Staff at Dreyfus' trial, 
was immediately struck by the familiarity of the handwriting. He 
compared it with the handwriting on the infamous bordereau and 
found them identical. Picquart pursued a private investigation and 
eventually became convinced that Esterhazy, not Dreyfus, was the 
traitor of 1894. He then informed his commanding officer, .General 
Gonse, of his discovery. The general ordered him not to pursue the 
matter. 
At this point Picquart did a remarkable thing. He told the general, 
"I will not take this secret to the grave with me. "3 Afterwards Pic-
quart communicated his suspicions about Esterhazy to his old friend 
and lawyer, Maitre Louis Leblois. Ranking officers on the General 
Staff including General Gonse and his superior, General de Boisdeffre, 
became alarmed at the prospect of disclosures by Picquart. They, 
along with officers in the counterintelligence bureau, entered into a 
two-pronged conspiracy to destroy Picquart and fabricate further 
proofs of Dreyfus' guilt.4 To the latter end, Major Henry of counter-
intelligence forged a document that had the appearance of having 
come from the Italian military attache, Alessandro Panizzardi. The 
forgery was addressed to Panizzardi's German counterpart, von 
Schwarzkoppen, and stated: 
I have read that a Deputy is to pursue questioning about Dreyfus. If 
Rome is asked for new explanations, I will say that I never had any 
relations with the Jew. If they ask you, say the same, for no one must 
ever know what happened with him. [p. 173] 
Simultaneously, Picquart was dispatched on a frivolous mission 
designed to keep him away from Paris indefinitely. In his absence ma-
terial designed to discredit him was introduced into his personal 
dossier. 
· This plot to suppress the truth might have succeeded but for the 
revived interest of the press in the Dreyfus case. Bernard Lazare 
wrote an article accusing the military of framing Dreyfus and covering 
up its misdeeds. Lazare's well-informed charges provoked consterna-
tion within the military. This was followed by the public printing of a 
3. P. 168. As Bredin points out, General Gonse denied Picquart's version of this 
conversation. 
4. It is not clear whether the generals actually ordered that these steps be taken. There is 
little doubt, however, that they were the moral authors of the conspiracy. 
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facsimile of the original bordereau. The public display of his handwrit-
ing alerted Esterhazy to the growing danger that he might be exposed. 
Shortly thereafter, Mathieu Dreyfus publicly accused Esterhazy of 
treason. 
The airing of this charge pressured the army into instigating a for-
mal inquiry about Esterhazy. If the Dreyfus case were to remain 
closed, Esterhazy had to be exonerated. To this end, officers of the 
counterintelligence bureau were enlisted to provide guidance and sup-
port to Esterhazy. In essence, the General Staff entered into a treason-
ous plot to protect a known German spy and scoundrel. Eventually, 
Esterhazy was tried and acquitted of treason in a farcical military 
proceeding. 
Emile Zola, one of the leading popular novelists of the day, was 
outraged by the army's behavior in the Dreyfus and Esterhazy cases. 
In response he composed a ringing attack on the military. This piece, 
entitled J'accuse, was published on January 13, 1898. It proved to be a 
milestone both in the Dreyfus Affair and in the history of western 
journalism. In J'accuse Zola denounced the army and various of its 
officers as participants in a criminal conspiracy to deprive an innocent 
Alfred Dreyfus of his freedom. Zola drew a significant segment of the 
French intellectual elite into the fight for Dreyfus and ignited a turbu-
lent political struggle. 
Zola was indicted for criminal libel and, amid riotous anti-semitic 
demonstrations, was tried before a jury in a civilian court. At Zola's 
trial the leading military figures in the Dreyfus case testified and deliv-
ered their unsupported opinions that Dreyfus was guilty. The army 
did everything in its power to make the case against Zola a choice 
between the military guardians of La Patrie and Dreyfus, the outcast 
Jew. Royalists, nationalists, and anti-semitic thugs packed the court-
room. There was fighting in the streets and an air of menace hung 
over the Court of Assizes. The judge in charge of the case, 
Delegorgue, shamelessly permitted the military the broadest latitude 
while tightly constraining those representing Zola. Eventually, Gen-
eral Georges Pellieux declared that the army had absolute and irrefu-
table proof against Dreyfus in the form of the Panizzardi letter (the 
document Major Henry had forged). The military, however, refused 
to produce the letter. Despite this and the testimony of Lieutenant 
Colonel Picquart disclosing the army's misbehavior, the jury convicted 
Zola. 
Ironically, the army's victory in the Zola case proved to be its un-
doing. It sparked an outpouring of support for Dreyfus that could not 
be silenced. In one more attempt to end the crisis a new Minister of 
War, Godefroy Cavaignac, sought to marshal the proofs that demon-
strated Dreyfus' guilt. Cavaignac's plan was to set the documents out 
publicly and then have the government prosecute as traitors all who 
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dared to oppose its position. The first step in this scheme was a speech 
in Parliament delivered by Cavaignac on July 7, 1898. The whole plan 
came apart when an officer assisting Cavaignac, Captain Louis 
Cuignet, discovered that one of the key documents - the Panizzardi 
letter- was a forgery. To his credit Cavaignac investigated and even-
tually forced the forger, Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) Henry to 
admit his crime. Henry was taken into custody and promptly pro-
ceeded to commit suicide. 
Even in the face of damning proof of military misbehavior, many 
in the government and army struggled to block Dreyfus' appeal. 
Eventually, they were overridden and Parliament voted to have the 
Criminal Chamber of the High Court of Appeal examine whether 
Dreyfus should be retried. When it became clear that the Criminal 
Chamber was going to order a new trial, Parliament, in a shameful 
failure of will, voted to withdraw the Criminal Chamber's jurisdiction 
and throw the case open to the examination of the entire High Court 
of Appeal (which had two other branches besides its Criminal Cham-
ber). This unprecedented tampering with the judicial process did not 
succeed in blocking a new trial. The entire court ordered that Dreyfus 
be retried by a military tribunal. 
The second trial before a military court opened in Rennes on Au-
gust 7, 1899. Despite all that had happened, much of the unsavory 
evidence previously introduced was once again utilized. Military lead-
ers again opined, without proof or justification, that Dreyfus was 
guilty. Again they were allowed to frame the case as a choice between 
themselves and Dreyfus. This unfortunate situation was exacerbated 
by a bitter dispute within Dreyfus' defense team. To the shock of the 
onlooking world and the immense satisfaction of the army, Dreyfus 
was again convicted (albeit by a divided panel). The decision created a 
firestorm of protest, and the government which had at long last come 
to side with the Dreyfusards sought a compromise to extricate itself 
from the morass. Despite the protests of many ardent supporters, in 
the spring of 1900 Alfred Dreyfus accepted an amnesty that applied to 
his tormentors as well as himself. Although the architects of conspir-
acy had all been driven from office, none had been criminally 
prosecuted. 
The dispute did not end with the granting of amnesty. In 1903 
Dre'yfus was allowed to seek revision of the Rennes verdict. After a 
lengthy and bitter process Dreyfus was exonerated on July 12, 1906. 
He was thereafter restored to rank and awarded the Legion of Honor. 
The case had raged for twelve years, had led to at least one suicide, 
had caused the fall of numerous generals and politicians, and had 
thoroughly convulsed the country. 
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II. THE BOOK 
Jean-Denis Bredin has written a marvelous book about the Drey-
fus case. It is scholarly, balanced, and beautifully written. Its 600 
pages comprise a careful and cogent analysis of virtually every aspect 
of the byzantine affair. Every major event in the case is explored in 
detail. The courtroom proceedings in the two Dreyfus trials, the Es-
terhazy trial, the Zola trial, and the ensuing appeals in all these cases 
are especially well rendered by Mr. Bredin, who is both a practicing 
lawyer and legal scholar. 
The book includes lively portraits of most of the major characters 
in the drama. It painstakingly traces the roles of scores of politicians, 
soldiers, and intellectuals. It is especially good in presenting the 
human side of those caught in the toils of a crisis they could not re-
solve. Among the few characters slighted in this othenvise brilliant 
presentation are Colonel Jean Sandherr, the chief of counterintel-
ligence when Dreyfus was charged, and Lucie Hadamard Dreyfus, Al-
fred's wife. Sandherr occupied one of the most sensitive posts in the 
military at the time the case against Dreyfus was assembled. Those 
who framed the case and manipulated the evidence were under his 
direct command. More might have been done to explore his role in 
these events, especially in light of the fact that he was a consummate 
anti-semite who had previously refused to allow Dreyfus to serve in his 
bureau.5 
Lucie Dreyfus was a courageous and virtually tireless campaigner 
on behalf of her husband. She shared in many of the decisions that 
affected his case. With her correspondence she singlehandedly sus-
tained Alfred in his darkest days. Bredin might have done more to 
explore her special perspective on the Affair and the impact of the case 
on her life. 
Bredin brings an amazingly broad array of information to bear in 
explaining the Dreyfus case. He displays a virtuoso's mastery of the 
riotous politics of the Third Republic at the tum of the century and 
neatly succeeds in placing the case in its political context. His knowl-
edge of Dreyfus' correspondence and prison journal is concordance-
like. From careful scrutiny of the texts, Bredin is able to make telling 
points about Dreyfus' perception of his case, his religious views, and 
his courage. Similarly, Bredin is able to use effectively the scholarship 
that has analyzed the voluminous lists of contributors to and support-
ers of anti-Dreyfusard organizations. Bredin marshals this informa-
tion to provide the reader with a telling portrait of the forces in French 
society opposed to justice for a Jewish officer. 
5. For a broader interpretation of Sandherr's role see G. CHAPMAN, THE DREYFUS TRIALS 
40-42 (1972). 
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Ill. THE LESSONS OF THE DREYFUS CASE 
There is something far more important about Mr. Bredin's book 
than its scholarly care and narrative grace. The Affair describes and 
explores a moment in modem western history when integrity and jus-
tice won out over race hatred, nationalist demagoguery, militarism, 
and media frenzy. The book provides us with nothing less than proof 
that men's struggle for justice can overcome popular prejudice. 
Dreyfus' sufferings are a paradigm of the experiences of victims of 
politically motivated oppression in modem times. Without justifica-
tion, Dreyfus was hurled into prison and convicted of treason. His 
only offense was being Jewish. He was the forerunner of the millions 
who were driven into the Nazi death camps and the thousands who 
still languish in the Gulag. How Dreyfus came to triumph despite the 
wishes of at least half a dozen French presidents and prime ministers, 
hundreds of other politicians, thousands of military men, and tens-of-
thousands of anti-semitic hoodlums is a story worth repeating and per-
haps even learning by heart. 
In essence, it is the story of the incredible courage of a few. Chief 
among them is Dreyfus himself. Alfred Dreyfus was not a likeable 
man. He was cold, distant, and rigid. Yet, as Bredin so skillfully in-
forms us, Dreyfus had the stuff of greatness in him. When absolute 
catastrophe befell him he refused to be crushed. When he was con-
demned to an imprisonment perhaps as dreadful as Auschwitz, he re-
fused to go meekly to his grave. Rather, with all the human resources 
at his disposal, he fought for his dignity and for justice. His seemingly 
naive refusal to be broken, despite the vast power the state brought to 
bear, tells us a great deal about human fortitude and its wellsprings in 
unswerving insistence upon that which is right. Dreyfus can teach us 
a critical lesson about resistance to tyranny and the power inherent in 
a refusal to accept the cynical vision of a world deaf to moral claims. 
Had Dreyfus stood alone, however, he would undoubtedly have 
shared the fate of Hitler's victims, Stalin's opponents, and the Argen-
tine desaparecidos. Dreyfus was saved because others came to his res-
cue. They too are the heroes of the Dreyfus Affair. All shared with 
Dreyfus an unquenchable belief in justice and a willingness to take the 
greatest risks to secure it. In some ways their actions are even more 
extraordinary than Dreyfus' because they had little personal stake in 
the outcome. Theirs was a disinterested dedication to seeing the right 
vindicated. Three who exemplify this magnificent band are Georges 
Picquart, Emile Zola, and Jean Jaures. 
Picquart was, to all appearances, the model military careerist. He 
was one of the fastest-rising soldiers in the French military when ap-
pointed head of counterintelligence in 1896. Then he made the fateful 
discovery of tpe petit bleu. Picquart did what any good soldier would 
- he took)he matter up with his superior, General Gonse. It is here 
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that Picquart's story departs from the ordinary. Gonse instructed him 
to forget the whole thing, and Picquart responded by choosing the 
path of conscience rather than career. He refused to remain silent and 
thereby perpetuate an injustice. Picquart's choice had the most imme-
diate and dire consequences for him. He was dispatched to the fron-
tiers of France and eventually to riskier climes like the unpacified 
borders of Tunisia. While he was on his travels a dossier was assem-
bled to ruin his reputation and undermine his standing in the military. 
Picquart survived all this and, in the momentous trials of 1898 and 
thereafter, came forward repeatedly to speak the truth as he knew it. 
For his courage he was vilified, drummed out of the military, jailed for 
more than a year, and threatened with criminal prosecution. Through 
it all Picquart remained steadfast. He provided the proofs upon which 
Dreyfus' appeal became possible. He parted the curtain of silence that 
the army had attempted to erect around Dreyfus. The cost in personal 
terms was enormous, but Picquart bore it without complaint. His in-
sistence on seeing justice done was extraordinary, all the more so when 
one considers that it flew in the face of his prejudices (he had voiced 
anti-semitic views on a number of occasions), the interests of his caste, 
and his personal well-being. 
The injustice of the Dreyfus case insulted Emile Zola as an intellec-
tual. 6 It spurred him to employ his powerful literary talents on behalf 
of the Jewish victim wrongfully condemned. In fighting for Dreyfus, 
Zola joined a proud tradition in France that had its roots in the En-
lightenment when Voltaire had devoted his energies to attacking mis-
carriages of justice like that in the Calas case. 7 Once Zola became 
convinced of Dreyfus' innocence, he fearlessly took up his pen as a 
weapon in the fight for the captain's life. 
Zola faced substantial risks in speaking out. He made his liveli-
hood through the publication of popular novels. The vast majority of 
his reading public was anti-Dreyfusard and likely to take offense at his 
stand. Yet he chose to speak. His choice was a critical one because he 
struck perhaps the decisive blow on Dreyfus' behalf. In 1898 Ester-
hazy was tried and acquitted of treason. Virtually the entire nation 
took the verdict as a definitive rejection of Dreyfus' claims, and it 
seemed that no way remained open to overcome public resistance to 
the truth. At this dark moment Zola composed J'accuse and with its 
publication launched the campaign that would eventually result in 
Dreyfus' freedom. 
Zola wrote J'accuse with the express understanding that he was 
courting prosecution. He was eventually charged with criminal libel. 
6. Bredin argues that the very term "intellectual" gained currency during the Dreyfus Affair 
and was first used as a pejorative by anti-Dreyfusards to describe the captain's supporters. P. 
276. 
7. See P. GAY, 2 THE ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION 433-37 (1969). 
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In a pair of tumultuous trials, during which Zola's life was repeatedly 
threatened by howling mobs, he was convicted and sentenced to a year 
in jail. At the urging of friends, Zola fled his homeland and took up an 
expatriate's existence in London. He continued the fight, however, 
and shared in the final triumph. It may be that Zola paid the highest 
price of any of Dreyfus' supporters. Not long after his return to 
France he died under circumstances that suggest he was killed by anti-
Dreyfusards. 8 Zola's part in the Affair is a monument to the strength 
of the idea of justice. With truth as his weapon he fashioned an indict-
ment of the entire French establishment and made his charges stick. 
He showed that men of ideas can make a difference and that an appeal 
for fairness can be more powerful than the oppressive apparatus of the 
state. One has to wonder whether the sad history of our century 
would have been different if there had been more like him. 
The Socialist political leader Jean Jaures was a third heroic figure 
in the Dreyfus case. During the early phases of the Affair, it was the 
general consensus among French Socialists that the case was a bour-
geois problem of no importance to the Left except insofar as it under-
mined the capitalists' ability to govern. Socialists saw Dreyfus as the 
son of a rich capitalist exploiter who was getting far more considera-
tion than any worker or poor soldier would ever get. Jaures said as 
much in an 1895 speech in Parliament, while calling for the readop-
tion of the death penalty for treason.9 
By 1897, however, Jaures was one of the first elected officials to 
move toward the Dreyfusard camp. His motivation was an unalter-
able detestation of all injustice, seeing in it "a symbolic explanation of 
collective iniquities" (p. 198). Jaures' choice alienated both voters 
(who turned him out of office in 1898) and fellow Socialists. Despite 
the political costs, Jaures persevered and became the architect of the 
1906 revision that exonerated Dreyfus of all charges. His words about 
the cause of justice deserve to be repeated: 
[O]n the day that a crime is committed against a man, on the day that it 
is committed by a bourgeois hand, but while the proletariat, by interven-
ing, might have stopped the crime, it is no longer the bourgeoisie alone 
that is responsible, but the proletariat itself. For by not stopping the 
hand of the murderer ready to strike, it becomes the murderer's accom-
plice. And then it is not a blot on the setting capitalist sun, but a blot on 
8. The case for murder is most strongly stated in D. LEWIS, PRISONERS OF HONOUR 310-11 
(1973). Others, including Bredin, are more circumspect. P. 455. See also, e.g., N. HALASZ, 
CAPTAIN DREYFUS 250 (1955). 
9. Jaures declared: 
Captain Dreyfus, convicted of treason in a unanimous verdict, did not receive the death 
sentence. As opposed to those results, the country sees that simply [sic] soldiers are shot 
without pardon or pity for a momentary lapse or act of violence .... We have the duty to 
ask ourselves whether the nation's justice should remain unarmed in the event that abomi-
nable acts analogous to that committed by Captain Dreyfus were to recur. 
P. 98. 
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the rising socialist sun. We have wanted none of that shameful stain on 
the dawn of the proletariat. [p. 526] 
For Jaures human dignity was the measure of all things. 
[T]he value of every institution is relative to the human individual. It is 
the human individual, affirming his will to be free, to live, and to grow 
who henceforth is to bring life to institutions and ideas. It is the human 
individual who is the measure of all things, of country, family, property, 
humanity, and God. That is the logic of the revolutionary idea. That is 
socialism. [p. 497] 
Many called these views na.lve, unrealistic, or even a betrayal of the 
"revolutionary idea." But such thoughts were the finest flowering of 
the movement that freed Dreyfus. Had they been heeded more often 
the bloody trail to Buchenwald and Krasnaya Presnya 10 might have 
been avoided. 
Men like Dreyfus, Picquart, Zola, and J aures are the real heroes of 
the twentieth century. They are the spiritual forebears of Sharansky, 
Solzhenitsyn, and Wiesel. They remind us that despite terrible odds in 
a cruel world, integrity lives and that insistence upon justice can be an 
incredibly powerful weapon in the fight against tyranny. E.P. Thomp-
son has argued that the elite's reliance on the rhetoric of justice can 
create pressure on the ruling classes to conform their conduct to ar-
ticulated standards of fairness. 11 The lesson of the Dreyfus case is that 
such rhetoric can be a potent weapon when wielded by the oppressed. 
The struggle for justice is never concluded. It seems that govern-
ments are incapable of internalizing the lessons to be learned from 
cases like that of Captain Dreyfus. All too soon the Dreyfus Affair 
was forgotten in France. In 1917 an ardent supporter of Dreyfus, Cle-
menceau, acting as Prime Minister, rejected all consideration of de-
cency and prosecuted political opponents to bolster the morale of the 
army (p. 499). In our day no one should be smug. No form of judicial 
procedure will insure justice. The danger of hatred and prejudice is 
ever-present. The darkness is always close at hand, and the light of 
truth can all too easily be extinguished. Jean-Denis Bredin reminds us 
that it may not always be snuffed out and that there are men and 
women who will fight for justice. For these reminders merci, Mon-
sieur Bredin! 
10. This is one of the transit camps in what Solzhenitsyn describes as the "Gulag Archipel-
ago." See 1 A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 537-64 (1973). 
11. See E. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 258-69 
(1975). 
